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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Harley Gomez contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to
dismiss his withheld judgment as the district court’s analysis was directly contrary to the
plain language of the relevant statute. Specifically, he asserts that the factor the district
court considered as the sole basis for denying his motion was not relevant to the scope
of the statutory analysis. Mr. Gomez contends that, under the plain language of the
statute, he met his burden to make a satisfactory showing that there was good cause for
his request for relief. Therefore, this Court should vacate the order denying his motion
to dismiss the withheld judgment and remand this case for a determination of what relief
Mr. Gomez should receive under the statute.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Following Mr. Gomez’s plea of guilty to grand theft, the district court withheld
judgment and ordered Mr. Gomez to complete a five-year term of probation. (R., pp.3235.) No motions alleging probation violations were filed during that period of probation.
(See generally R.) Accordingly, once the period of probation ended, Mr. Gomez moved
the district court dismiss the withheld judgment pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b).
(R., p.40.) Specifically, he asserted, “The probation period has expired, and the terms
and conditions of probation imposed by the Court have been fulfilled.” (R., p.40.)
The prosecutor objected to Mr. Gomez’s motion arguing that, during the period of
probation, Mr. Gomez had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor disturbing the peace in an
unrelated case. (R., pp.44-45.) The prosecutor admitted that no corresponding
allegation of a probation violation had been filed in the instant case, which he asserted
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was due to the Department of Correction not telling him about that conviction.
(R., pp.44-45.) Regardless, the prosecutor argued that, based on the existence of that
unrelated conviction, “the Defendant has failed to demonstrate good cause for granting
the requested relief.” (R., p.45.) The day after the prosecutor filed the State’s objection,
the district court decided, “For the reasons set forth in the State’s objection, Defendant’s
motion is denied without a hearing.” (R., p.46.)
Mr. Gomez filed a notice of appeal timely from the order denying his motion to
dismiss the withheld judgment. (R., pp.48-49.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Gomez’s motion to dismiss his
withheld judgment.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gomez’s Motion To Dismiss His
Withheld Judgment
A.

The District Court’s Analysis Is Directly Contrary To The Plain Language Of The
Relevant Statute
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and so, is considered de novo on

appeal. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011). “The interpretation of a statute
must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain,
usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the
statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as
written.” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr, 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal
quotations omitted). “When determining the plain meaning of the statute, effect must be
given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant.” Id. at 897 (internal quotation omitted).
Under the plain language of I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b), Mr. Gomez made a satisfactory
showing of good cause by showing no probation violations had been found or admitted
to during a probation violation proceeding while he was on probation. (See R., p.40.)
As such, he should have been considered eligible to receive relief under the statute.
However, the district decided he was not eligible to receive such relief because it
concluded he failed to demonstrate good cause based only on the existence of the
unrelated conviction. (See R., pp.45-46 (adopting the State’s argument as the rationale
for its decision without further comment).) The district court’s analysis to that effect runs
contrary to the plain language of the statute.
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After his period of probation expired, Mr. Gomez applied for relief, specifically
requesting the dismissal of his withheld judgment pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1)(a)(i).1
(See R., pp.32, 40.) The portions of the statute relevant to evaluating Mr. Gomez’s
application provide as follows:
Upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that:
(i) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any
probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of
the terms or conditions of any probation that may have been
imposed;
....
the court, if convinced by the showing made . . . that there is good cause
for granting the requested relief, may terminate the sentence or set aside
the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant and finally dismiss the
case and discharge the defendant or may amend the judgment of
conviction form a term in the custody of the state board of correction to
‘confinement in a penal facility’ for the number of days served prior to
sentencing, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a
misdemeanor conviction.
I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b). The plain language of the statute provides that all Mr. Gomez
needed to show to establish good cause, and so, be eligible for relief, is that there were
no findings of, or admissions to, violations of the terms of his probation during a

Previously, the Idaho Supreme Court has expressed concerns with whether the district
courts had authority under I.C. § 19-2604 to consider applications for relief filed after the
period of probation has expired. See State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521, 527 n.3 (2013).
However, the Idaho Legislature has subsequently amended the statute, clarifying that
the provision about “continuing the period of probation” (the provision which concerned
the Guess Court) applies only “should the defendant be on probation at the time of the
application.” See 2014 Idaho Laws Ch. 283. Thus, in cases where the defendant is not
on probation at the time of the application for relief, the statute simply provides that the
defendant must make a satisfactory showing of good cause for granting relief, as
defined by the statute. See id. Therefore, under the amended version of the statute,
the district court had authority to consider Mr. Gomez’s motion even though it was filed
after the period of probation ended.
1
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probation violation proceeding: “the court, if convinced by the showing made . . . that
there is good cause.” Id. (emphasis added). Since a “satisfactory showing” under the
statute only needs to show that no violations were found or admitted to during any
probation violation proceeding, id., and the district court’s analysis is based on “the
showing made,” id., the district court’s analysis must be limited to the same factors as
are required for the showing itself. Otherwise, the phrase “by the showing made” would
be meaningless. Therefore, the critical question in Mr. Gomez’s case is: whether the
district court could properly consider the unrelated conviction in determining whether
Mr. Gomez’s application showed good cause under section (1)(b)(i).
The plain language of the statute clearly provides that it could not.

As the

prosecutor admitted, there were no probation violation proceedings in regard to the
unrelated conviction in this case. (R., pp.44-45.) Section (1)(b)(i) limits the scope of the
relevant analysis to whether there are findings of, or admission to, violations “in any
probation violation proceeding.” I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b)(i) (emphasis added). Since no
such finding or admission was made in any probation violation proceeding, the plain
language of the statute provides the district court could not properly consider the
unrelated conviction in the good cause determination.
Put another way, allowing the district court to consider such factors would render
the phrase “in any probation violation proceeding” meaningless. If the district court
could consider the factors beyond that limitation, the defendant’s application would have
to address such factors, and the whole concept that a showing is “satisfactory” if it only
addresses the factors identified in section (1)(b)(i) would be pointless.

For similar

reasons, the district court’s analysis would also render the phrase “by the showing

6

made” meaningless.

As such, the district court’s analysis is contrary to the plain

language of the statute.
As a result, the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Gomez’s request for relief
based solely on that erroneous analysis should be vacated and the case remanded for
consideration of what relief Mr. Gomez should receive under the plain language of the
statute.
B.

If This Court Concludes The Statutory Language Is Ambiguous, The Legislative
History Reveals Mr. Gomez’s Reading Of The Statute Most Reasonably Reflects
The Legislative Intent
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a statute is ambiguous if:
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds might be
uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. However, ambiguity is not
established merely because different possible interpretations are
presented to a court. If this were the case then all statutes that are the
subject of litigation could be considered ambiguous . . . . [A] statute is not
ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise more than one
interpretation of it.

State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 80 (2015) (internal quotation omitted) (alterations in
original). If a statute is ambiguous, the courts construe the statute so as to give effect to
the legislative intent. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274 (2004). The courts will look to
the legislative history behind the statute, as well as the words of the statute, to
determine which of the competing interpretations most reasonably reflects the
legislative intent. See, e.g., State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475 (2007).
The legislative history of I.C. § 19-2604 reveals that Mr. Gomez’s interpretation
(as set forth in Section A, supra) is the most reasonable reflection of the legislative
intent. Critically, in 2011, the Legislature revised subsection (1) in regard to the scope
of the information relevant to an application for relief. See 2011 Idaho Laws Ch. 187.
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Prior to the 2011 amendment, subsection (1) required the defendant’s application for
relief to show that “the defendant has at all times complied with the terms and
conditions upon which he was placed on probation.” See id. The Legislature replaced
that language with the current language: “The court did not find, and the defendant did
not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of the
terms or conditions of probation.” Id.
While the district court’s analysis in Mr. Gomez’s case may have been
appropriate under the pre-2011 version of the statute, since a new misdemeanor
conviction would be indicative of noncompliance with the terms of Mr. Gomez’s
probation (see R., pp.32-35), the legislative history reveals that the Legislature decided
that was not the appropriate analysis for deciding whether the defendant was eligible for
relief under the statute. Rather, it reveals the Legislature intentionally abandoned that
approach and restricted the scope of the relevant analysis to only findings of, or
admissions to, a violation which occurred during any probation violation proceeding, as
per Mr. Gomez’s interpretation of the statute.
Furthermore, the Legislature added a section to the statute in 2014 which makes
its intent in this regard even more clear. The new section provides: “(5) A violation of
the terms of supervision with the board of correction by a person under the supervision
of the board shall not preclude the granting of relief to that person under this section.”2
2014 Idaho Laws Ch. 283.

The Legislature repeated that statement in the bill’s

preamble. See id.; see also Idaho Comm’n on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho

When judgment is withheld, the defendant is placed on probation under the
supervision of the board of correction. I.C. § 19-2601(5); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho
454, 460 (1991). Therefore, section (5) applies to Mr. Gomez’s case.
2
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215, 217 (1973) (“By its nature a preamble is prefatory and declarative of public policy.
Since the preamble is indicative of the legislative purpose only . . . .”). Therefore, the
legislative history of I.C. § 19-2604 reveals that Mr. Gomez’s interpretation – that the
mere fact that a potential violation exists, but was not found or admitted to be a violation
at a probation violation proceeding, is not relevant to the determination of whether he
has shown good cause, such that he would be eligible for relief under the statute – is
the most reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent behind I.C. § 19-2604.
Thus, the district court’s decision – that Mr. Gomez had not shown good cause
due only to the existence of the unrelated conviction (see R., pp.45-46) – was contrary
to the legislative intent behind I.C. § 19-2604.

Accordingly, even if this Court

determines the statute is ambiguous, it should still vacate the district court’s order and
remand the case for consideration of what relief Mr. Gomez should receive under the
statute.
Alternatively, this Court should apply the rule of lenity and reach the same
conclusion. The rule of lenity provides that, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, it must be
construed in the defendant’s favor. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440 (Ct. App.
2013). This rule is particularly applicable if examination of the legislative history does
not provide clarity regarding the legislative intent behind the statute. See id. Thus,
even if the statute remains ambiguous after a review of the legislative history discussed
supra, this Court should still vacate the order denying Mr. Gomez’s motion and remand
the case for consideration of what relief Mr. Gomez should receive under the statute
pursuant to the rule of lenity.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Gomez respectfully requests this Court vacate the order denying his motion
to dismiss the withheld judgment and remand this case for a determination of what
relief Mr. Gomez should receive under the statute.
DATED this 9th day of September, 2016.

_______/s/__________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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